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ABSTRACT 
Scholarship on algorithms has drawn on the analogy between 
algorithmic systems and bureaucracies to diagnose shortcom­
ings in algorithmic decision-making. We extend the analogy 
further by drawing on Michel Crozier’s theory of bureaucratic 
organizations to analyze the relationship between algorithmic 
and human decision-making power. We present algorithms 
as analogous to impartial bureaucratic rules for controlling 
action, and argue that discretionary decision-making power 
in algorithmic systems accumulates at locations where un­
certainty about the operation of algorithms persists. This key 
point of our essay connects with Alkhatib and Bernstein’s the­
ory of ’street-level algorithms’, and highlights that the role of 
human discretion in algorithmic systems is to accommodate 
uncertain situations which inflexible algorithms cannot han­
dle. We conclude by discussing how the analysis and design 
of algorithmic systems could seek to identify and cultivate 
important sources of uncertainty, to enable the human discre­
tionary work that enhances systemic resilience in the face of 
algorithmic errors. 
Author Keywords 
Algorithmic systems; Algorithmic power; Uncertainty; 
Bureaucracy; Street-level algorithms; Street-level 
bureaucracies; Automated decision-making. 
CCS Concepts 
•Human-centered computing → Collaborative and so­
cial computing theory, concepts and paradigms; •Applied
computing→ Law, social and behavioral sciences; 
INTRODUCTION 
Research on the social implications of algorithmic systems 
(e.g., [1, 14]) invites us to consider automated information 
processing as analogous to decision-making in bureaucra­
cies. In this essay, we elaborate on this analogy between al­
gorithmic systems and bureaucratic organizations. We con­
tribute an analytical approach that emphasizes uncertainty 
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as a key concept to investigating how human and automated 
decision-making interact to produce powerful consequences. 
Understanding this interaction is important, given the increas­
ing societal role of algorithmic processes in supporting and 
automating decisions that have been traditionally made by hu­
mans – across contexts as varied as governance [35], media 
[24, 3], health [60], and everyday life [72]. 
We develop the bureaucracy analogy to make it compatible 
with the well-established view that algorithmic systems are 
socio-technical. That is, we treat algorithmic systems as set­
tings where implementations of algorithms intermesh with 
human action, practices, institutional conditions, and other 
technological artefacts. This view of technological systems as 
socially situated has been central in both HCI literature (e.g., 
[68, 33, 74]) and critical algorithm studies (e.g., [3, 4, 51, 
15]). Our contribution is to build a bridge between this long­
standing work and organizational theory on bureaucracy, as it 
is applied to analyze algorithmic systems. By doing so, we 
respond to calls for conceptual work in HCI [54], exploring 
conceptually how humans interact with algorithmic systems. 
We draw on Michel Crozier’s [18] theory of bureaucratic sys­
tems of organization and propose to treat algorithmic systems 
as analogous to dysfunctional organizations. Both kinds of 
systems seek to subsume decision-making under rigid rule-
governed procedures, but risk becoming too inflexible to 
adapt to unpredictable errors. Crozier’s theory holds that dis­
cretionary decision-making in such inflexible systems hap­
pens at places where there is uncertainty about rule applica­
tion. Analogously, when it comes to algorithmic systems that 
involve inflexible automated processes, we argue that human 
discretionary decision-making works at locations of uncer­
tainty. These are points in the decision-process where formal 
rules cannot be turned into actionable consequences without 
human judgment (cf., [18]). This analogy highlights that dis­
cretionary decision-making power works even in extensively 
automated systems, drawing on persisting uncertainties to in­
fluence decision-making. While this point in itself might not 
strike as novel to HCI [74], we deem it worth reiterating in 
relation to algorithmic systems that often take the appearance 
of objectivity or eliminating human decision-making [24]. 
Overall, the algorithms we focus on can be described as rec­
ommendation systems — a category commonly explored in 
the context of algorithmic power both within HCI [1] and crit­
ical studies on algorithms [4]. In particular, we examine su­
pervised machine learning and rule-based systems for classi­
fying data. These algorithms can be said to be inflexible in the 
sense that their decisions are based on previously collected 
training data or predetermined criteria that cannot be reflex­
ively modified at the moment of decision [1]. Importantly, 
algorithms that are inflexible in this sense can be retrained or 
modified to account for errors after decisions. Further, their 
decision boundaries can be very flexible in the sense of fitting 
to complex data. However, they are inflexible in the sense of 
being unable to reflect on novel features of unseen cases at 
the moment of decision-making. 
In prior work, Alkhatib and Bernstein [1] have used the bu­
reaucracy analogy to propose that this kind of inflexibility 
constitutes an essential difference between human and algo­
rithmic decision-making. They link the dysfunctions of algo­
rithmic systems to human discretion being replaced with in­
flexible algorithms. However, as the authors themselves note, 
their theory does not account for situations where algorithms 
interact with human discretion. Our approach, building on the 
socio-technical view of algorithmic systems, emphasizes that 
algorithms rarely work in solitude. As such, the dysfunctions 
of many algorithmic systems cannot be properly understood 
by focusing solely on algorithmic inflexibility. Crozier’s the­
ory enables us to develop the bureaucracy analogy to account 
for this insight, while retaining its main point that algorithmic 
inflexibility is a source of error. Uncertainty becomes the key 
concept for analyzing how human discretion manages inflex­
ibility to influence decisions in algorithmic systems. 
To unpack our argument, we discuss three illustrative cases 
from prior literature: the use of risk prediction models in 
criminal court [15], an automated housing allocation system 
for the homeless [22], and automated worker-to-task match­
ing on crowdwork platforms [28]. These cases correspond 
to increasing levels of automation in the system. While in 
the first case humans have leeway to exercise discretion, in 
the latter two decision-making is rigidly automated. How­
ever, in each case human action finds ways to influence the 
consequences of algorithmic processes. We demonstrate our 
analytical approach by identifying in each case how humans 
use discretion to deal with uncertainties within the system. 
Finally, on the basis of the cases, we discuss conceptual 
implications and explore how our perspective relates to de­
sign directions that seek to account for uncertainty in human-
algorithm collaboration. 
In the following, we first present the relevant theoretical back­
ground, considering how bureaucracies have been defined in 
the past and what is already known about decision-making 
in algorithmic systems. After presenting our analytical ap­
proach, we turn to the three cases to illustrate its usefulness. 
We contribute a theoretically-grounded perspective that high­
lights, first, how humans and algorithms collaborate to form a 
bureaucracy-like system (this does not happen by algorithms 
alone, cf. [1]), and second, that algorithmic inflexibility is 
managed at locations of uncertainty. To conclude, we offer 
some initial thoughts on how design work could account for 
and even emphasize locations of uncertainty. 
BUREAUCRACY AND ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS 
We now introduce three different accounts of bureaucracy as 
a foundation for considering the analogy between bureaucra­
cies and algorithmic systems. We start with the classical ideal 
type of bureaucracy as a machine-like system governed by 
formal rules. Second, we move to Michael Lipsky’s [44] the­
ory of street-level bureaucracy, which emphasizes the role 
of human discretion in rule application. Finally, we intro­
duce Crozier’s [18] theory of bureaucracies as dysfunctional 
systems of organization where human discretion and formal 
decision-making interact. Each of these accounts belongs to a 
long theoretical tradition with extensive literature. We present 
the theories in a schematic fashion in order to highlight their 
main points and contrasts. In particular, our intention is to fo­
cus on how uncertainty, emphasized by Crozier, enables ana­
lyzing the role of discretion in bureaucratic systems. Table 1 
summarizes these three accounts of bureaucracy and high­
lights how they differ in their analyses of decision-making 
power. 
Classical views of bureaucracy 
In management and organization sciences, political science 
and public administration research, much emphasis has been 
put on decision making and bureaucracy – not only in pub­
lic organizations but in all kinds of organizations. Accord­
ing to Weber [71] and Jaques [38], organizational decision 
making should be structured in specialized and hierarchical 
functions, with clear and centralized management, and per­
sonnel development should be focused on professional qual­
ifications. Here, the underlying idea is that of organization 
as a machine, which takes commands from management and 
mechanically executes them [49]. From this classical per­
spective, the decision-making criteria of bureaucratic organi­
zations are seen to be rational and the goal of the organization 
is to maintain the overall rationality and handle all cases in 
a consistent fashion. The aims of rationality and robustness 
make the connection between bureaucracy and algorithmic 
systems clear: bureaucracies, too, are meant to function like 
machines, taking inputs and systematically delivering outputs 
based on them. 
This classical view of bureaucratic rationality was put for­
ward by Weber as an ideal type that itself is never fully 
realized but that provides a point of contrast for studying 
real organizations: for example, bounded models of rational­
ity [62] and the different functions organizations have [49] 
constrain their operation in the idealized manner. Due to 
these concerns, later social scientific accounts have sought 
to characterize bureaucratic decision-making by focusing on 
the practices through which formal rules are applied in con­
crete situations. This is the starting point for the theory of 
street-level bureaucracy [44] that Alkhatib and Bernstein [1] 
resurfaced as a resource for analyzing algorithmic decision-
making power. 
Street-level bureaucracy and street-level algorithms 
Michael Lipsky’s [44] theory of street-level bureaucracy pro­
poses that decision-making in public policy does not me­
chanically follow abstract policy rules. Rather, effective pol­
icy application necessarily involves the reflexive discretion of 
      
         
Classical bureaucracy Street-level bureaucracy Crozierian bureaucracy
Definition Machine-like system governed Rule-governed system which Rule-governed system which is 
by hierarchically organized depends on the discretion of in- unable to flexibly correct its er­
rules. dividual officials. rors. 
Location of power Supervisors in command of for- Individual officials with discre- Interplay of formal and discre­
mal decision-making power. tionary power. tionary power, both seeking to 
control uncertainty. 
Level of automa- High. Low, case-by-case. Aspires to high automation but 
tion fails to control discretion. 
Table 1. Schematic conceptions of bureaucracy and their dimensions.
street-level bureaucrats (on-the-ground human officials, such 
as police officers, judges, social workers, and teachers) who 
are responsible for adapting abstract rules to concrete situa­
tions. Although the decisions of street-level bureaucrats are 
directed and constrained by policy rules, in Lipsky’s analysis 
it is the discretionary application of rules to particular cases 
that really comes to constitute organizational policy. Thus, 
in contrast to the ideal of classical bureaucracy, described 
schematically above, street-level bureaucracy does not locate 
decision-making power at central management positions in 
formal hierarchy. In this account, the focus is rather on the 
discretionary power of individual officials, emphasizing their 
practices and routines of rule application (see Table 1). 
Recent discussion in HCI has connected this perspective to 
algorithmic decision-making. Building on Lipsky’s theory, 
Alkhatib and Bernstein [1] propose a theory of street-level al­
gorithms, or algorithms that “directly interact with and make 
decisions about people in a sociotechnical system” [44, p. 
2]. Examples they draw on include YouTube content modera­
tion algorithms (e.g., [26, 40]), quality assessment algorithms 
on crowdwork platforms [2], and recidivism risk prediction 
models in criminal justice [15]. Analogously to human of­
ficials, responsible for bridging the gap between high-level 
policy rules and concrete situations, street-level algorithms 
are the layer of information processing in algorithmic systems 
that is “specifically responsible for making decisions that af­
fect the lives of the users and stakeholders” [1, p. 3]. 
However, Alkhatib and Bernstein argue that, unlike in street-
level bureaucracies, in algorithmic decision-making reflexive 
discretion plays no role. Algorithmic decisions must follow 
predetermined design features which govern the systems’ op­
eration, based on necessarily limited training data. Although 
algorithms can be retrained or modified after detecting errors 
in their decisions – leaving room for instance for recourse 
processes to mitigate biases [1, pp. 8-9] – they cannot flexi­
bly adapt their decision boundaries at the moment of decision 
to treat novel or marginal cases correctly. This leads to the 
potential of mistreating users or clients. The inflexibility of 
algorithms and digital systems has been recognized to limit 
reflexive policy making also in public administration litera­
ture [9, 37]. 
We view this conceptualization as an important contribu­
tion to addressing the shortcomings of algorithmic decision-
making. The theory of street-level algorithms connects the 
issue of algorithmic power to longstanding literature on orga­
nizational decision-making but it has the limitation of being 
geared mainly to deal with cases of fully automated decision-
making where human discretion plays little role (cf., [1, p. 
10]). By definition, the theory does not cover situations 
where algorithms are used in roles other than that of replac­
ing human agents. Yet, as a long lineage of studies in both 
HCI [33, 43, 74, 28] and critical algorithm studies [3, 4, 51, 
15, 61] argue, many algorithmic systems are based on hu­
mans and algorithms collaborating and interacting. In such 
socio-technical systems, power and the associated dysfunc­
tions cannot be analyzed merely by focusing on decisions 
made by automated systems. Rather, the analytic focus must 
expand to include wider aspects of the socio-technical set­
ting. To achieve such theoretical expansion in the bureau­
cracy analogy, we turn to Crozier’s theory of bureaucratic 
systems of organization, and in particular its focus on uncer­
tainty. 
Crozier’s theory of bureaucratic systems of organization 
According to Crozier’s theory [18], any system of organiza­
tion that cannot flexibly correct its behavior in the face of 
errors is a bureaucratic system. Exemplary cases discussed 
by Crozier included a Parisian clerical agency and a state-
owned French industrial monopoly, both of which were un­
able to cope with human relations issues and technical prob­
lems, to the detriment of their efficient functioning. Crozier’s 
theory views bureaucratic organizations not as rational ma­
chines, but rather as complex rule-governed socio-technical 
setups, where systemic inflexibility is a defining feature. Sim­
ilar issues of inflexibility in the face of errors have been docu­
mented to occur with algorithmic systems, too. For instance, 
Google has struggled to react to what appeared like coordi­
nated manipulation of search results because of pressures re­
lated to neutrality and objectivity [25]. 
Crozierian bureaucracies are born through the establishment 
of rigid sets of rules, which seek to meticulously govern all 
human action within the organization. The aim in establish­
ing such rules is to centralize decision-making power and to 
eliminate as many sources of uncertainty as possible in the or­
ganization’s operations. For achieving this aim, it is essential 
that bureaucratic rules aim towards impartiality – in the sense 
that no human discretion in applying them is required – and 
totality, so that ideally every aspect of the system’s operation 
can be predicted and controlled. That is, the ideal model of 
a Crozierian bureaucratic organization is a procedurally fully 
automated system, akin to the classical ideal type of bureau­
cratic rationality. 
However, Crozier illustrated with his case studies how this 
model of organization remains an unattained ideal. For in­
stance, the Parisian clerical agency was a large organization 
with poor working conditions and low staff morale. The 
agency was unable to rectify these problems due to strict na­
tional control of its operation. Work in the agency alternated 
between periods of routine and crisis, caused by occasional 
spikes in the volume of service calls. During crisis, the or­
ganization could only respond by policing its rules ever more 
strictly. This led to further lowering of work morale – a prime 
example of what Crozier called the bureaucratic vicious cir­
cle [18, p. 111]. In the case of the industrial monopoly, facto­
ries constrained by hierarchical rules were struggling to make 
necessary reforms in production technology and staff. This 
situation hindered productivity and enabled the development 
of uncontrolled power within the factories. 
A central insight that Crozier demonstrated through his case 
studies was that, instead of eliminating human discretion, the 
establishment of rigid rules in bureaucracies leads to discre­
tionary power accumulating in the hands of actors who have 
the capability or skills to control the remaining sources of 
uncertainty [18, Pt. I-II]. A case in point was the industrial 
monopoly, where occasional malfunctions of production ma­
chinery constituted a significant unpredictable factor in the 
organization’s operations. This source of uncertainty could 
only be controlled by the plants’ maintenance personnel, who 
possessed the skills necessary for repairing the machines – 
an expert status which gave them crucial strategic leverage 
in the organization. As long as the maintenance personnel 
superficially aligned their work with the formal rules of the 
organization, they were able to retain leeway in deciding how 
and when repair takes place. Thus, bureaucratic rules – which 
could not strictly determine how repair work was to be car­
ried out – also effectively worked to make the organization 
too rigid to establish centralized control over significant fail­
ures in functioning. 
The implication of Crozier’s theory is that the bureaucratic 
tendency towards centralized control is a counterproductive 
aim: It sacrifices flexibility and adaptability for systemic pre­
dictability and optimization. According to Crozier, control­
ling for all sources of uncertainty in complex organizations 
is impossible [19], and thus bureaucratic rules – rather than 
achieving machine-like rationality – effectively redistribute 
discretion to the locations of remaining uncertainty within 
the system. In this sense, Crozier’s account aligns with the 
street-level bureaucracy’s idea that discretion is necessary for 
rule application. However, the import of Crozier’s theory is to 
identify how discretionary power manages to operate within 
the confines of rigid formal rules. The key locations at which 
discretion finds leeway are the uncertainties that cannot be ac­
commodated in terms of bureaucratic rules. The discretionary 
work at these locations can easily go unrecognized, because 
formal rules give the system an appearance of effectiveness 
and impartiality [56]. A focus on uncertainty allows us to see 
through these appearances, and analyze how discretion works 
jointly with formal rules to produce decisions. 
In what follows, we treat algorithmic systems as analogous 
to Crozierian bureaucratic systems. We pose the analogy be­
tween rigid bureaucratic rules and inflexible automated infor­
mation processing to highlight uncertainty as key to analyzing 
how such inflexibility is managed in algorithmic systems. 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
Our analytical approach draws on Crozier’s theory of bureau­
cratic systems of organization to provide a systematic way 
of studying how human discretion and algorithmic processes 
relate. In this section, we first describe the key components 
of our approach, which proceeds by 1) identifying locations 
of uncertainty in algorithmic systems and 2) analyzing how 
discretion works at those locations. Second, we discuss how 
the bureaucracy analogy based on Crozier’s theory relates to 
the well-established view of algorithmic systems as socio-
technical. We will proceed to the illustrative cases in the next 
section to demonstrate our approach. 
Analyzing power through locations of uncertainty 
Uncertainty in Crozierian bureaucracies is defined in terms of 
incapability to predict and control events which influence the 
organization’s operations. Uncertain future events are un­
knowable, and as such they are different from risk, under­
stood as probabilistic evaluations of different possible out­
comes of a procedure (c.f., [7, 42]). Calculating the prob­
ability of future events under uncertainty is impossible, and 
consequently decisions will have to include an element of dis­
cretion. 
The import of Crozier’s theory for analyzing power in al­
gorithmic systems is twofold. First, adapting this perspec­
tive to algorithmic systems suggests, by analogy, that power 
in such systems accumulates at locations where uncertainty 
about the operation of algorithms persists. Therefore, as the 
degree of automation in algorithmic systems grows, power in 
the form of reflexive discretion accumulates more and more 
tightly around tasks which cannot be automated, that is, to 
human agents. These are the locations of uncertainty where 
the operation of algorithms cannot yield actionable outcomes 
without intervening human judgment. Second, this perspec­
tive enables us to distinguish between different locations at 
which humans can come to have discretionary power. As our 
case discussion will illustrate, uncertainty in algorithmic sys­
tems can variously persist in interpreting algorithmic outputs, 
maintaining algorithms in operation, or coordinating human 
actions. 
Supporting vs replacing human decision-making 
To make sense of how humans interact with algorithmic sys­
tems, we distinguish between two roles through which al­
gorithms can have power: automating or supporting human 
decision-making. Algorithms can be used to replace humans 
in certain tasks, through “encoding of human agency” [34] 
in programmatic and automated decision structures. For in­
stance, the Facebook newsfeed [12, 57, 21] or Google PageR­
ank [25, 75] algorithms are examples where automated tech­
nology replaces more traditional editorial work in deciding 
what information should be displayed to users (c.f. [24, p. 
192]). In these cases the discretionary power is located in 
various stages of developing and maintaining the algorithmic 
system. By contrast, the use of risk assessment models in 
court by judges [15], or doctors’ use of predictive modeling 
of infections [46] are cases where algorithms serve as support 
systems that can extend or steer human action but ultimately 
leave room for discretion. 
We argue that algorithms enter into complex interactions 
with humans both in their supporting and replacing roles. 
These insights highlight the need to subsequently examine 
the practices and institutional conditions which lead to par­
ticular power configurations. Crozier’s theory provides us 
with a systematic approach to achieve this, as it is specifically 
fleshed out to deal with systems where human discretionary 
decision-making is at play, despite efforts at automation. 
Power in socio-technical systems 
As has been long argued in both HCI and the critical al­
gorithm studies literature, automated information processing 
is always situated in and shaped by features of the socio-
technical systems within which it operates [68, 33, 51, 3]. 
Accordingly, while there is broad consensus that algorithmic 
systems can have power – in that they make automated de­
cisions [69, 45] or act as information gatekeepers [25, 13, 
41] – the consequences of algorithms have been recognized 
to depend for their meaning and efficacy on a larger system 
of human interpretative work, institutional context, and work 
practices [51]. Thus, recent literature on algorithmic systems 
continues well-established discussions on power and values 
in technical systems, following in the footsteps of, for ex­
ample, Suchman’s work on human-machine reconfigurations 
[68], Bowker and Star’s insights into classification [10], and 
Friedman et al.’s and Nissenbaum’s sensitivity to values and 
differing stakeholder views [23, 52]. 
The bureaucracy analogy adds to the socio-technical view of 
algorithmic systems the idea that algorithms may be viewed 
as extensions of bureaucratic administration – as tools for 
governance and management – analogous to more traditional 
mechanisms for administering and classifying people, such 
as forms and questionnaires [14]. This characterization leads 
to framing discussions about the shortcomings of algorithms 
in a fresh way. For instance, discussions about problems 
with decision-making algorithms have tended to emphasize 
the discrimination their use may cause (see, e.g. [27, 63, 76]), 
focusing on technical solutions that aim to increase the fair­
ness, accountability and transparency (FAT) of algorithms 
and machine learning systems. From the perspective of the 
bureaucracy analogy, technical solutions to problems in algo­
rithmic systems constitute new administrative mechanisms, 
which potentially lead to redistributions of power that merit 
further analysis. Our analytical approach implies that focus­
ing on persistent uncertainties is key to analyzing the way in 
which power works in the resulting systems. 
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
We use three cases from prior literature to demonstrate the 
usefulness of our analytical approach. These cases were se­
lected to highlight that human actors can purposefully lever­
age uncertainty in even extensively automated algorithmic 
systems. To illustrate how this happens in different kinds of 
systems, we first examine a case where algorithms are used to 
support the work done by human decision-makers, namely, in 
the use of risk prediction models in criminal justice (Christin, 
[15]). Second and third, we examine cases where the aim is to 
automate human-decision making. We examine an automated 
system for ranking and matching homeless people with avail­
able housing (Eubanks, [22]) and worker-to-task matching on 
crowdwork platforms (Gray and Suri [28]). In both of these, 
we will see how discretion finds leeway to influence the sys­
tem’s operation, respectively through uncertainty involved in 
repairing or maintaining the ranking algorithm’s operation, 
or through coordinating human work in relation to inflexible 
crowdwork assessment algorithms. We conclude each section 
by summarizing the key observations. 
Case 1: Risk prediction support systems in criminal court 
Our first case is based on a study by Christin [15] on the use 
of algorithms for modeling criminal recidivism in U.S. courts. 
This case is set against the background of an exponential in­
crease in U.S. jail and prison population during the past 50 
years, along with a growing awareness of racial bias at “ev­
ery step of the process” [15, p. 5]. The stated aim behind 
the recent widespread adoption of risk prediction algorithms 
in U.S. courts is to reduce incarceration rates and alleviate 
bias in judicial decision-making, by making judges’ decisions 
more objective and better grounded in data (see e.g. the 2013 
TED talk by Anne Milgram [48]). However, as noted by 
Christin [15, p. 6], this stated aim has been strongly contested 
in recent debate (see, e.g. [5]), with the argument that pre­
diction algorithms end up amplifying and reinforcing biases 
instead of reducing them [53]. Risk prediction in court, thus, 
is a case where algorithms are used with the explicit intent to 
support the work of human decision-makers, but where a con­
flicting relationship persists between human and algorithmic 
agents. 
The bias-reinforcing tendency of predictions has been diag­
nosed to result from necessarily limited training data [1, pp. 
7-8]. Given marginal or novel cases, including for instance 
intersectional combinations of traits that together have no an­
tecedent in previously collected data, risk prediction algo­
rithms are bound to produce incorrect results. At worst, these 
end up replicating biased decisions reified in past cases. Con­
sequently, Alkhatib and Bernstein argue that the commonly 
advocated principles of fairness, accountability, and trans­
parency in algorithmic design are an insufficient goal in ju­
dicial decision-making, and that retaining an element of re­
flexive discretion in the process is necessary for the just treat­
ment of novel and marginal cases. The judges interviewed by 
Christin [15, p. 9] agree, holding that subjective discretion 
in court decision-making is constitutive of justice. Indeed, as 
Christin’s study shows, judges in U.S. courts often oppose al­
gorithms, maintaining their discretionary power through the 
strategies of ignoring, manipulating, and openly criticizing 
the information produced by prediction models [15, pp. 9­
10]. 
Given our analytical approach, our concern here is to under­
stand how the judges’ authority to criticize the prediction al­
gorithm is grounded in the wider social and organizational 
setting within which the algorithms are used. Importantly, 
Christin [15, pp. 10-11] locates the judges’ authority to criti­
cize algorithms to stem from the uncertainty associated with 
interpreting the results of prediction algorithms as evidence 
in the context of justice. More particularly, this source of un­
certainty has to do with the lack of precedents in the legal 
tradition of relying on algorithmic information processing as 
evidence: 
In criminal justice, innovation does not come with the 
glitter and appeal that it has in other sectors: it is often 
a source of uncertainty, because by definition an innova­
tion arrives without the vetting of precedent. Any incen­
tive to use new tools must be balanced against the clear 
motivations for relying on legal tradition. [15, p. 10] 
Here, we observe how the institutional context influences who 
has the power to interpret algorithmic outcomes. The un­
certainty associated with algorithmic predictions in judicial 
decision-making thus derives from the traditional practices of 
the criminal justice institution. Judges – who traditionally 
represent the legitimate source of decision-making power in 
courts – are able to retain their discretionary power and rein­
force it through openly attacking risk prediction algorithms. 
As Christin maintains, in the context of criminal justice, algo­
rithmic predictive modeling needs to “become part of the tra­
dition before it can be trusted” [15, p. 11]. Before the source 
of this interpretive uncertainty can be eliminated, then, the 
judges’ discretion will likely continue to command decision-
making power in criminal court – albeit this power might be 
masked “under the patina of objectivity” [15, p. 10] that sur­
rounds algorithmic technologies [24, 14, 8, 56]. As noted 
above, formal rules can give bureaucracies the appearance of 
impartiality. The use of algorithms can work toward the same 
effect, making decisions seemingly independent from the ef­
fect of human judgments. 
To sum, this case suggests that when algorithms are used to 
support (rather than automate) decision-making, the interpre­
tation of algorithmic outcomes can be a significant source of 
uncertainty. Humans can interpret algorithmic outcomes if 
they have an appropriate institutional position or other kind 
of institutional credentials for doing so. In other words, the 
power of algorithmic systems is a mutual product of auto­
mated and discretionary decision-making. This means that 
the use of automated procedures for guiding human decisions 
leads discretionary decision-making power to accumulate in 
the hands of people, who are by training, expertise, or in­
stitutional position/credentials legitimated to decide what the 
outputs of algorithms should be taken to mean, and whether 
they should be taken seriously and acted upon. 
Case 2: Automated housing allocation for the homeless 
Our second case – an automated matching algorithm devel­
oped for evaluating the housing needs of homeless people in 
Los Angeles, as documented by Eubanks [22] – diverges from 
the first one in that here, the purpose of using algorithms was 
not to support, but rather to automate the decision-making 
process. The express motivations for using algorithms were 
similar to the previous case, however. First, the system was 
intended to improve efficiency, in response to a boom in the 
number of people living on the street in Los Angeles. Second, 
algorithmic allocation sought to enact impartiality, through 
an automated ranking system based on a standardized survey 
questionnaire administered to the homeless as part of their 
housing application procedure. On the basis of survey re­
sponses, a ranking algorithm first calculated a score for each 
applicant and ranked them according to their need for hous­
ing. Then, another algorithm was run to match available 
housing opportunities with people who meet their eligibility 
criteria. The underlying aim of this process was to provide 
housing as quickly as possible to the people who need it the 
most, and who are most suitable for the available apartments. 
Before automated housing allocation, unhoused people in Los 
Angeles had to go through a complex and time-consuming 
system of street-level bureaucracy, where waiting times were 
long due to the constant resource scarcity of service providers 
[22]. Thus, the stated aim of establishing the automated sys­
tem was to move decision-making power away from places 
where it was inefficient, and to reinstall it to work through an 
efficient and impartial algorithmic process. 
However, on the basis of her interviews with homeless ap­
plicants, the system’s designers, and data gathering workers, 
Eubanks argued that what the system really amounted to was 
a tool for surveying and sanctioning the homeless. The sys­
tem’s working depended on establishing a survey database 
of homeless people, which – in addition to their personal 
information – contained entries about private issues such as 
drug abuse and sexual behavior. As such, Eubanks argued 
that the system also represents a shift from community po­
lice work, carried out by street-level bureaucrats in interaction 
with neighborhoods familiar to them, to data-based surveil­
lance classifying people socially on the basis of predeter­
mined criteria. 
Most importantly for our argument, algorithmic allocation 
redistributed discretionary power to work at a location of un­
certainty where decisions could not be automated: the gath­
ering of surveillance data. Eubanks followed several cases 
of homeless applicants and showed how different application 
agencies had varying interpretations about how to record sur­
vey responses into the allocation system [22]. While the al­
gorithmic allocation system carried formal power for making 
decisions, this power only became efficacious through vari­
ous interpretations of the data gathering instruments. More­
over, Eubanks describes how these interpretations worked on 
the basis of criteria extraneous to the application process. 
Data collectors in different agencies judged the same appli­
cants differently, on the basis of the applicants’ attitude and 
the collectors’ diverging ideas of how the allocation system 
should work. Thus, uncertainty about how responses should 
be recorded in the system led to the data collectors gaining 
power to impose their views of how the homeless should live 
on the system’s operation. 
In accordance with Crozier’s analysis of bureaucratic organi­
zations, in this case we see how controlling for all possible 
sources of uncertainty is infeasible. Despite extensive au­
tomation, the system depended on data collection that could 
not be standardized extensively enough to eliminate discre­
tion. Thus, this case demonstrates the point previously ar­
gued by Dourish [20] that algorithmic processes cannot be 
properly understood in isolation from their particular imple­
mentations as programs and the data that they draw on. 
Analogously to Crozier’s analysis of the power of factory 
maintenance personnel, we see how the dependency of al­
gorithmic decision-making on implementation leads discre­
tionary power to accumulate in the hands of those involved 
in maintaining algorithms. As has been discussed in the lit­
erature, the work involved in implementing algorithms may 
include specifying criteria used in classification [51] and iter­
ative maintenance to keep particular implementations opera­
tional. Data collection and curation can be regarded as part 
of such repair work [36] involved in maintaining algorithmic 
information processing [55]. This is not to say that repair 
would not play a role when algorithms are used as support 
systems (see e.g., [59]). However, recognizing this source of 
uncertainty becomes pivotal in cases of extensive automation, 
where human actors ostensibly lack decision-making power. 
To sum, when algorithms are used to automate decision-
making, interpretation of outcomes can no longer be con­
trolled by discretion. Instead, significant uncertainty can per­
sist in relation to implementing algorithms as programs. This 
uncertainty can be controlled by those who have access to 
designing or maintaining algorithmic technologies, such as 
data collectors or people responsible for correcting program 
implementations. Thus, especially in the case of extensively 
automated algorithmic systems, discretionary power can end 
up in the hands of unexpected groups of people. Automation 
of decision-making does not eliminate discretion, but rather 
redistributes it to work at locations where the system’s oper­
ation is maintained. This implies that also the dysfunctions 
of extensively automated systems can be due to unrecognized 
discretionary work. 
Case 3: Automated task matching in crowdwork 
The final case we discuss – worker-to-task matching on 
crowdwork platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk – 
is also discussed by Alkhatib and Bernstein [1], as a form 
of piecework [2] that is essentially managed by automated 
quality assessment procedures. According to Alkhatib and 
Bernstein, the relationship of crowdworkers to quality control 
algorithms is similar to that of factory workers to their fore­
men, whose responsibility it was to assign work tasks to the 
workers who could best carry them out, and to evaluate the 
workers’ performance in order to direct their skill develop­
ment. This task essentially depended on discretion in assess­
ing the match between each idiosyncratic task, worker skills, 
and different styles of working. It is this crucial discretionary 
element that quality assessment algorithms have come to re­
place on crowdwork platforms. Consequently, research has 
found that crowdworkers must deal with a constant fear of 
unnecessary rejection by inflexible automated processes [47]. 
Algorithmic evaluation tied by strict definitions of success­
ful task completion can at worst end up rejecting work that 
diverges from gold-standard solutions only in irrelevant or 
marginal ways [39]. 
Alkhatib and Bernstein’s analysis identifies a central problem 
in automated worker-to-task matching. Rigid automated con­
trol displaces decision-making power from human supervi­
sors and consequently places crowdworkers under pervasive 
uncertainty concerning appropriate task completion. To be 
sure, the underlying intent behind algorithmic work assess­
ment is to provide efficient procedures for coordinating dis­
tributed cooperative work at large scales. However, this does 
not mean that the discretionary work of quality assessment 
disappears. This is one of the central messages of Gray and 
Suri’s [28] recent analysis of ghost work – that is, the invisible 
crowdwork involved in the operation of many technological 
systems. Gray and Suri argue that, despite the automation of 
worker-to-task matching, the discretionary efforts involved in 
these procedures – the “transaction costs of ghost work” – do 
not disappear, but instead are “shifted to the shoulders of re­
questers and workers” [28]. Thus, paradoxically, automated 
management all but eliminates human discretion in work as­
sessment. Instead, what algorithmic matching achieves is a 
redistribution of the responsibility of handling this workload, 
from the hands of platform employees to on-demand workers 
and task providers. By fixing rigid criteria for task evaluation, 
algorithmic matching glosses over the uncertainty involved in 
coordinating workers’ skills with the requested tasks. Conse­
quently, the discretionary work required to control this uncer­
tainty is redistributed to workers and task providers. In this 
case we see how algorithms can redistribute the negative dis­
cretionary duties involved in maintaining system operation. 
The essential difficulty involved in automating worker-to-task 
coordination is that it is practically impossible to enumer­
ate exhaustively the multiple different ways in which all but 
very simple tasks can be completed (c.f., [16]). Thus, in 
this case, uncertainty stems from the inherent difficulty of 
pre-determining an interpretation for all possible actions that 
workers can undertake in completing a given task [68]. Of 
course, the difficulty of evaluation will vary from task to task. 
However, the problem of automated quality control in the 
case of crowdwork remains that of classifying a potentially 
unlimited number of different solutions using criteria which 
by necessity can capture only a limited number of cases [1]. 
As Gray and Suri note [28], for all relevant practical purposes, 
the quality assessment on crowdwork platforms works in an 
automated fashion. In automated worker-to-task matching in 
crowdwork, humans do not in practice have the possibility to 
directly override algorithmic decisions. Also, platform de­
sign does not permit requesters or workers to influence the 
operation of quality control algorithms. Instead, crowdwork­
ers engage in efforts to coordinate their work through var­
ious informal channels in order to determine what kinds of 
solutions will be accepted for different tasks. For instance, 
workers have been found to engage in back-channel commu­
nication [29] to discuss different solutions and the reliability 
of task providers. Such invisible coordination efforts have 
been discussed in the CSCW literature as articulation work, 
or discretionary work which maintains the efficiency of coop­
eration in the face of unexpected difficulties [66, 67]. In ghost 
work, articulation work serves the crucial function of miti­
gating the risk of unnecessary rejections by improving the fit 
between automated evaluation and available solutions. Fur­
ther, research has found that automated management of dis­
tributed work can lead to workers developing work-arounds 
to circumvent assessment [43]. The literature on algorithmic 
systems has recently started to discuss these latter kinds of 
activities under the umbrella notion of “gaming” [6], or act­
ing strategically in order to intervene with established system 
behavior [30, 17]. 
As in the case of automated housing allocation, it is important 
to recognize these roles of discretion. As emphasized in prior 
literature, articulation work tends to be invisible by default 
[66]. Furthermore, gaming algorithms has been noted to be 
so ubiquitous that it is difficult to identify algorithmic systems 
which do not involve gaming in some form [6]. This implies 
that even in cases of extensive automation, some uncertainty 
always persists concerning the system’s operation. 
To conclude, the potential for users to coordinate their actions 
is a significant source of uncertainty in extensively automated 
algorithmic systems. The implications and dysfunctions of 
automated systems thus depend partly on user activities and 
their coordination. For instance, biased outcomes might be 
due to an imbalance in knowledge about algorithms, which 
benefits only some groups of users, while disadvantaging oth­
ers. 
CONCEPTUAL IMPLICATIONS 
The cases we have discussed illustrate the key insight of our 
analytical approach: when it comes to analyzing algorith­
mic systems, powerful consequences are a mutual product 
of automated and human discretionary decision-making. Un­
certainty is a key concept for understanding the process that 
leads to them. We now elaborate on this insight to draw con­
ceptual implications from our analysis. 
Algorithmic inflexibility in socio-technical systems 
In all the three cases we discussed, discretion worked to con­
trol sources of uncertainty in order to accommodate unan­
ticipated circumstances. These cases demonstrate that the 
shortcomings and consequences of algorithmic systems can­
not be understood by focusing solely on algorithmic inflex­
ibility, not even when studying cases where human-decision 
making is replaced – rather than just supported – by auto­
mated decision-making. Human discretion can conflict with 
the formalized decision-making power of algorithms, as il­
lustrated in Cases 1 and 3, or it can draw on automated pro­
cedures to impress its own agenda on the system’s operation, 
like in Case 2. 
Thus, the well-established insight that algorithmic systems 
are socio-technical merits restatement in the context of the bu­
reaucracy analogy. The theory of street-level algorithms high­
lights that algorithmic inflexibility is the source of dysfunc­
tions in algorithmic systems. Following this insight, Alkhatib 
and Bernstein [1] discuss potential avenues for managing in­
flexibility, through recourse and tools that enable users to 
detect and report errors. Inflexibility is not an insurmount­
able obstacle for their theory, as it recognizes the potential 
of retraining and corrective design. Our approach supple­
ments this account with the insight that recourse and user 
error management tools are effectively ways of enabling dis­
cretionary control of uncertainties. The way that these solu­
tions are implemented, then, should take into account what 
kinds of uncertainties persist in the system and how they are 
managed. In particular, we highlight that in many algorithmic 
systems, dysfunctions might not be due to algorithmic inflex­
ibility alone. Rather, they might also involve discretionary 
power that accumulates at persistent locations of uncertainty. 
Algorithmic inflexibility is only one factor that can cause dys­
functions in algorithmic systems, and this might go unnoticed 
in recourse processes that target inflexibility as a source of er­
ror. 
In addition to seeking to reapply the wealth of prior work on 
socio-technical systems, we draw a link to organization stud­
ies to highlight the societal importance and functioning of al­
gorithmic systems. Here, issues created by bureaucratic sys­
tems are well established in prior literature. Algorithmic in­
formation processing provides the possibility to handle mas­
sive amounts of digital data at speeds beyond human capa­
bilities. As such, algorithmic decision-making allows orga­
nizations to go further than traditional bureaucracies could 
in terms of automating processes in a rule-based manner. In 
extensively automated algorithmic systems, the gap between 
formal rules and their execution has become more stream­
lined than ever before. Consequently, as Caplan and boyd 
note [14], human control and grasp over the the systems’ ac­
tions is diminishing. Given these developments, it is more 
important than ever to develop theoretically-grounded ac­
counts for analysing and understanding the “soft spots” where 
streamlined algorithmic processes can go awry. Our approach 
contributes such an account, basing on the Crozierian focus 
on systemic uncertainties. 
Discretionary work adapts systems to uncertainties 
While we have discussed well-known cases of algorithmic 
systems – risk prediction in courts, housing allocation, and 
worker-to-task matching in crowdwork – our approach con­
tributes a fresh, theoretically grounded perspective on them 
by underlining the role of reflexive discretion in adapt­
ing inflexible algorithmic processes to unanticipated circum­
stances. From Crozierian perspective, the aim in automat­
ing decision-making is to establish control over uncertainties 
by rendering them calculable and predictable. As such, al­
gorithms are used with the purpose of turning uncertainties 
in decision-making into risks [42] so they could be evalu­
ated in an exact manner. Yet, it is often impossible to con­
vert all uncertainties in decision-making into risks without 
some residue. Unanticipated, marginal, and novel cases al­
ways turn up. As such, attempts to assimilate them under a 
single, rigid decision-making logic are bound to fail in com­
plex socio-technical contexts. 
Our contribution to the bureaucracy analogy lies in highlight­
ing that the residue of uncertainty – although often difficult to 
recognize – does not vanish in algorithmic systems, and that 
it is purposefully leveraged by human actors. Rather than 
eliminating issues of power, efforts at extensive automation 
shift the division and balance of power. Knowingly or not, 
automation may center power into new and sometimes unex­
pected hands. 
In arguing that discretionary work adapts algorithmic sys­
tems to uncertainties, we highlight how human action works 
to steer the system’s operation in accordance with its own 
purposes. It can either align with or go against the aims and 
intentions of designers or managers. Another way of saying 
this is that while automated processes can increase the sta­
bility of the system – the capability to maintain fixed func­
tioning in the face of unanticipated events – discretion works 
to make the system resilient, in the sense of accommodating 
unanticipated events as part of the system’s functioning (c.f., 
[31, 32]). As we saw above, such resilience can be built into 
algorithmic systems in different ways, and can easily go un­
recognized, especially when extensive automation is the aim. 
As already noted above, Crozier argued that organizations can 
plummet into a bureaucratic vicious circle, where errors due 
to inflexibility are responded to with increasingly rigid stan­
dardization. Similarly, we posit in the case of algorithmic 
systems that the drive towards increasing systemic stability 
can result in an algorithmic vicious circle, where the work 
done by discretion in influencing system behavior is hidden 
under seemingly extensive automation. Based on our analy­
sis, the design of algorithmic systems should seek to identify 
the work done by discretion in adapting automated processes 
to unanticipated circumstances. Instead of trying to eliminate 
sources of uncertainty in algorithmic systems, design could, 
instead, seek to cultivate relevant uncertainties, so that re­
silience is built into the system in a way that mitigates bias 
and discrimination in decision-making.1 
DESIGN DIRECTIONS TO CULTIVATE UNCERTAINTY 
In this section, we discuss initial ideas which design could 
explore to account for uncertainty in algorithmic systems. 
These ideas are not tried recommendations, but rather po­
tential directions for further inquiry. Our analytical approach 
highlights that uncertainty is a resource that discretion uses to 
manage inflexibility in even extensively automated systems. 
Future design of algorithmic systems could explore how this 
role of discretion can be supported in different contexts. To 
be sure, this idea is not new to HCI. However, the point is 
worth reiterating in the context of algorithmic systems which 
are often built with the express aim of automating away inef­
ficient human discretion in decision processes. The bureau­
cracy analogy can help shift focus in the development of these 
systems to the way algorithms redistribute rather than elim­
inate discretion in decision-making. Below, we discuss this 
idea for the use of algorithms as support and replacement of 
human decision-making, respectively. 
Design directions for supporting human-decision making 
HCI has for long developed solutions, such as mixed-
initiative interfaces [33], that learn iteratively from contextual 
information to optimize how automated processes communi­
cate with users. Researchers have explored human-centered 
design frameworks to develop autonomous systems whose 
1We recognize that not all tensions in algorithmic systems are be­
tween humans and automated processes. Tensions may also emerge 
between different stakeholders like users and developers. Crozier’s 
theory highlights that uncertainties are a strategical resource that ac­
tors can draw upon in organizational power struggles. An analysis 
of uncertainties in algorithmic systems could potentially shed light 
into tensions between different groups of people, too. 
behavior can be dynamically adjusted to accommodate unan­
ticipated situations in teamwork [11]. Yet, decision-support 
systems can fail in many situations, due to the difficulty 
of controlling all relevant uncertainties involved in complex 
decision-making contexts. For instance, as we saw in Case 
1, highly trained experts such as judges or doctors may be 
skeptical toward the usefulness of algorithmic recommenda­
tions (cf., [74]). Further, research has also shown that sup­
port systems have a tendency to bias human decision-making 
[64, 65]. The expertise of a judge to oppose the algorithmic 
prediction may not be the case for all users, and thus human 
agents can be primed by the results of algorithmic systems. 
In the context of support systems, our focus on cultivating un­
certainties aligns with Yang et al’s [74] suggestion to build on 
the users’ established routines in designing algorithmic sys­
tems. This approach, based on what Tolmie et al. [70] called 
“unremarkable computing”, seeks to support already exist­
ing work practices rather than alter them through remarkable 
automated solutions. However, what this means in different 
contexts is an open question that requires further research (cf., 
[73]). As our discussion of recidivism prediction in court il­
lustrated, investigating institutional context is key to grasping 
the relevant uncertainties involved in discretionary decision-
making. Again, this insight in itself is not novel to HCI [74], 
but merits repeating with respect to algorithmic systems that 
easily get criticized for inflexibility or praised for objectivity 
and efficiency. 
With respect to cultivating uncertainty, one possible design 
direction that research could explore are recommender sys­
tems that implement a negotiation style interaction process. 
For example, when it comes to Case 1, the judge would be 
forced to conduct a risk prediction before seeing the recom­
mendation from the system. If differences are large enough, 
both the judge and the system could be asked to list justifi­
cations for the prediction to negotiate the “appropriate” out­
come. Such a system would, thus, set the judges’ evaluations 
against algorithmic predictions. Doing so could put greater 
emphasis on the discretionary work of interpreting the algo­
rithms’ outputs, and might help offset the tendency to align 
decisions with computational predictions. Therefore, in algo­
rithmic systems the interface could provide opportunities for 
mixed interaction approaches [33]. However, as said, this is 
one possible direction to explore in future research that fol­
lows from our focus on uncertainty, and it should not be taken 
as a tried design recommendation. 
Finally, not all design implications are technical in nature – 
which, given the socio-technical nature of algorithmic sys­
tems, is not surprising. Strict rule-governed digital systems 
and institutional practices forced through them have been 
found to restrict reflexive discretion [37] and with informa­
tion systems users often create workaround-solutions [58]. In 
this regard, our analytical approach inspires further research 
to explore different institutional arrangements which give rise 
to divergent uncertainties in interaction with algorithms. For 
instance, should institutions have clear approval processes 
for cases where a human agent decides to override algorith­
mic recommendations? What level of expertise should be re­
  
quired for such actions in any given context? We believe doc­
umenting these practises helps coordinating human discretion 
with respect to automated processes. 
Design directions for replacing human work 
Cases where algorithms seek to replace human discretion 
have been extensively discussed in the literature (e.g., [1, 12, 
50]). Our analytical approach seeks to expand these discus­
sions through emphasizing the work done by reflexive hu­
man discretion also in cases of extensive automation. This 
insight was illustrated by our discussion of Cases 2 and 3: 
even when the express aim is to subvert human discretion, de­
cisions made within the algorithmic system often depend on 
a hybrid collaboration between humans and automated pro­
cesses. Attempts at automation do not eliminate discretionary 
decision-making power in the system, but rather redistribute 
it to work at locations of uncertainty which may go unrec­
ognized. That said, we acknowledge that there are good rea­
sons to aim at automating decision-making: These systems 
are used to process large numbers of mundane decisions. In 
many contexts, it is impractical to demand increased leeway 
for discretionary work. 
Nevertheless, we maintain that recognizing the invisible work 
done by discretion is crucial for designing algorithmic sys­
tems that replace human work. That is, in many cases while 
the moment of decision [1] is fully automated, the functions 
– and dysfunctions – of algorithmic systems emerge as a hy­
brid product of algorithmic and human action. Due to this, 
we believe that providing recourse or developing algorithms 
for increased reflexivity might not be sufficient to mitigate 
shortcomings in decision-making. In these solutions, the po­
tentially unrecognized hidden work of discretion is not ac­
counted for. 
A design direction which could help bring the hybrid nature 
of algorithmic systems in view might be to focus on how 
such systems are presented. For example, as we saw in Case 
2, the express motivations for deploying extensive automa­
tion in Los Angeles housing allocation were efficiency and 
impartiality in decision-making. The case illustrated that, in 
fact, the system did not unambiguously serve these purposes, 
while at the same time serving many that were not explicitly 
stated. Focusing on the language and form in presenting al­
gorithmic decision-making could help people to understand 
(and even challenge) algorithmic systems. Already at the 
time of this writing, the opaqueness of algorithmic systems 
leads to challenges. In Fall 2019, there was a public outcry 
related to privacy concerns with voice assistants: the public 
was surprised to learn that part of the audio files necessary 
for operating voice assistants were listened and analysed by 
human workers tasked to do hidden work for quality control 
purposes. In other words, if laypersons are not aware of the 
hidden human work in algorithmic systems, they may experi­
ence a sense of violation upon finding out about it. 
Our analytical approach suggests that an analysis of uncer­
tainties could help identify how humans are involved in main­
taining and coordinating decisions in highly automated sys­
tems. In such cases, a possible design direction to explore is 
the way in which discretion could be supported in stages like 
data collection and entry. One possibility is to include infor­
mation about the actors who make discretionary decisions as 
an additional input for the algorithmic decision process. First, 
this could be an additional field for data collection and entry 
staff. Second, algorithmic processes could also use the iden­
tity of different persons doing data collection and entry as an 
additional input field, thus allowing analysis on systemic dif­
ferences. Again, we want to emphasize that further research 
is required to explore the potential pitfalls and advantages of 
this initial idea in different contexts. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay, we have elaborated on bureaucracy as an anal­
ogy for studying algorithmic systems. Our account builds 
on Crozier’s [18] theory of bureaucratic systems as dysfunc­
tional organizations which cannot adapt to unanticipated sit­
uations. With the help of three illustrative cases documented 
in prior literature, we demonstrated how decision-making in 
algorithmic systems should be understood as the mutual prod­
uct of automated processes and discretionary human action. 
Analogously to rigid rules in Crozierian bureaucracies, we 
argued that automation in algorithmic systems does not elim­
inate discretion. Instead, discretion is redistributed to work at 
locations where it can leverage persistent uncertainty to influ­
ence decisions made in the system. 
While the cases we discussed illustrate some of the analytical 
benefits that a focus on uncertainties can provide, we also see 
a need for in-depth empirical research to document the dif­
ferent ways of controlling uncertainty in various algorithmic 
systems. We have focused on ambiguous cases where conse­
quences cannot be attributed to algorithms or human discre­
tion alone. In our view, extending the bureaucracy analogy 
to account for such cases can help analyze power in algorith­
mic systems as the joint outcome of human discretion and 
automated processes. Most importantly, the resulting account 
identifies uncertainty as the key concept in analyzing how in­
flexibility is managed in algorithmic systems. 
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